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ON THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE MORAL AGENCY
David B. Ray December 1985 9,r; Pages
Directed by: Drs. Ronald Nash, and Larry Mayhew
Department of Philosophy and
Religion Western Kentucky University
Much of the popular discussion of the social respon-
sibilities of corporations overlooks the fundamental
question of whether corporations (as opposed to their
employees) are the type of entities to which it is proper
to make responsibility ascriptions. That is the question
I address in this paper. I proceed by outlining the
criteria a subject must meet in order to qualify as a
moral agent (the most controversial of which when applied
to corporations is the capability of intentional action)
and then examining five popular views on the status of
corporations. The views vary widely in their
conclusions, from the position that corporations are
full-fledged members of the moral community to the theory
that it is only their employees that have moral
responsibilities. Regardless of their concl.usions all
are found deficient for one reason or another, most
criticisms boiling down to the claim that they are based
on an inadequate view of corporate structure or behavior.
Following organizational theorist Michael Keeley's
lead, I conclude that corporations are not moral agents,
although for much different reasons than any of the other
nay-sayers whose views I examine. I suggest that
iv
whatever the details of their arguments, all theories
that claim corporations are moral agents (and even some
who deny it) are based on an organismic model of
corporate behavior that involves goal-oriented behavior.
It is my contention that when the activities of
corporations are actually examined that no such corporate
intentional action can be identified and that
corporations therefore do not qualify as moral agents.
However, I also suggest that while we cannot properly
hold corporations morally responsible for their actions,
they are not shielded from moral judgements. As moral
agents, we are justified in preferring one type of
corporate activity over another (say, proper treatment of
toxic wastes over "midnight dumping") on moral grounds.
Finally, calling once again on Keeley, I point to an
alternative to the organismic model of corporate
behavior, the social-contract model, as a potentially
more fruitful tool of inquiry into the relationships
between corporations, individuals and society.
INTRODUCTION
The study of business ethics seems to have grown
increasingly popular in the last several years. It has,
at least, been given a good deal of attention in the
popular media.
The efforts of American business to re-examine and
reform itself in the face of stronger foreign competition
and a shifting economy have been widely reported in the
media and the subject of a great deal of popular
literature and has heightened awareness of questions
about not only how companies might operate more
efficiently, but also about how they might be made
better, healthier places to work and how the two relate.
Various minority and interest groups have pressured
businesses to change their practices through boycotts,
letter writing campaigns, protests, divestment and other
actions. Such actions have also received a great deal of
attention and served to raise broader questions about
businesses social and moral obligations.
But, in most of the popular discussion (and even a
great deal of the philosophical debate) concerning
business and morality, much is taken for granted.
Prior to the question of what or to whom a
corporation has moral responsibilities is the question of
1
whether or not corporations are the sort of lubjects to
which we can make moral ascriptions. Can corporations
themselves, as distinct from the people who make them up,
properly be called moral agents, decision-making actors
participating in the moral community.
That is the question I will explore in this paper.
Note, the question is not whether we do, in fact, place
moral blame or praise on corporations. Rather, the
question is whether we ought to, in the sense of having
sound philosophical reasons to.
We do not place moral blame or praise on inanimate
objects, animals, small children or severely mentally
retarded persons because they are not able to act or
think in the ways we believe necessary for subjects to be
held morally responsible for their behavior. If
corporations also are not capable of thinking or acting
in these ways, then they cannot properly be called moral
agents, and it would seem, should not be held morally
responsible for their actions.
I shall spend the first part of this paper trying to
elucidate the ways in which we expect a moral agent to be
able to act or think and the rest of the paper discussing
five popular and widely published philosophical positions
on whether corporations meet these requirements.
CORPORATIONS AND MORAL AGENCY
A3 I noted earlier, several unanswered (in fact,
unasked) questions underlay the popular debate on
corporate responsibility. The question most critical to
the whole exercise, at least the logically prior one,
concerns whether corporations are moral agents.
Are they the type of entities to which it makes sense
to ascribe moral predicates, such as praise or blame?
Are they capable of the level of behavior and thought
that we expect of those we hold morally responsible?
Philosophers often note the strong prima facie
evidence for answering yes. For instance, Peter French
has noted, our legal tradition considers corporations
persons, with many of the same rights and responsi-
bilities as human beings hold under the law.
1
Again, in everyday discourse we certainly talk about
corporations as if they were moral agents. We blame them
for certain actions, try to shame them into changing
their ways, and even occasionally praise them for doing
something morally upright.
And as Chrispopher Meyers has noted, we treat
corporations as if they were full-fledged members of the
1 
Peter A. French, "The Corporation As A Moral Per-
son," American  Philosophical Quarter, XVI (1979), 153.
3
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moral community, deserving of the same consideration we
show other people.
But, although not often noted, there is prima facie
evidence to the contrary as well.
Corporations are, indeed, considered persons under
the law. Yet, a popular interpretation of the juristic
notion of corporate personhood is that it is a legal
fiction, a construct useful in the law, but having no
relation to a corporation's metaphysical status.
We do commonly ascribe praise or guilt to
corporations, but we also simultaneously want to ascribe
blame or guilt to members of the corporation. This is
obviously different from the way we speak of human
agents. We don't praise a woman fo_ pulling a drowning
child from a river and also praise her hands.
In general, we simply treat corporations differently
than we do people. Our consciences don't bother us as
much if we take home items from work that belong to the
company as we would if we took something that belonged to
one of our co-workers.
In fact, evidence shows that as a society we do not
hold many of the same attitudes we once did toward
corporations. It is a common complaint, for instance,
that younger workers do not display the same loyalty to
their employers as older workers did in the past. Why is
5
this? Has the moral status of corporations changed in
the last 25 years?
So it seems we have prima facie evidence that
corporations are moral agents and that they are not, or
at least are moral creatures of a different sort than
human beings. How do we decide which of or practices
and intuitions to follow?
To answer this question we must dig deeper than
"common" sense. And the first step in this effort will
be to outline what it is we mean by moral agency. What
are the criteria that must be met to be considered a
member of the moral community?
I should, perhaps, clear up a matter of terminology
before we proceed. As we shall see there is substantial
disagreement over the meaning of the terms "moral
agency," "moral personhood," and "metaphysical
personhood." This disagreement results in a good deal of
confusion. The terms are often used without definition,
making it difficult to compare what any two given writers
have to say about any one of the concepts. Still more
confusion is created when a writer misinterprets the way
in which another philosopher has used one of the terms.
I shall try to avoid creating more confusion by being
as clear as possible about what I mean when I use the
terms "moral agent" or "moral person," and where possible
clear up some of the confusion that already exists.
What we are after here is what is at minimum required
of a subject if we are to be able to hold it morally
6
responsible for its actions. Whether that condition,
being an entity to which it is proper to make
responsibility ascriptions, is termed "moral agency" or
"moral personhood" seems to me to be largely a matter of
convention. Nonetheless, there are historical
precedents. We cannot, of course, willy-nilly depart
from accepted usage. However, as I have already noted,
historic usage does not serve as much of a guide in this
case.
For my purposes, I shall use the term "moral agent"
to refer to the condition of being an entity about which
it is proper, or makes sense, to ascribe moral predicates
such as "good" or "bad," "praiseworthy" or
"blameworthy."2
Exactly what is required to qualify as a moral agent
remains to be seen. A start may be made by more closely
examining why in our daily lives we count some entities
as moral agents and some not.
As said earlier, the judgment seems to be based on
some assumed criteria concerning how a subject that
qualifies as a moral agent should be able to think or
act. Why is it that severely mentally retarded persons
and higher order animals such as dogs and cats, gorillas
and dolphins are not (at least not by most people)
2
The choice of this terminology is not meant to
Imply any views about the relation of moral agency to
moral personhood or of either, or both, to metaphysical
personhood.
7
thought of as what I've called moral agents? What
happens, what changes in a human child when it passes
"the age of accountability?"
There appears to be some elusive capability(ies) that
separates animals from moral persons. But what is it?
One clue might be gained by taking a look at a few
valid excuses for those acknowledged as moral agents.
Perhaps the most often heard excuse (and hardest to
verify) is (A) "That (the result in question) isn't what
I intended." If challenged on the grounds that the moral
agent should have foreseen that the consequences of the
action taken would have resulted in the event in question
(or at least, not in the intended events), A is usually
accompanied by (B) "There is no way I could have foreseen
this consequence" or "There were circumstances beyond
my control that made it impossible for me to have
foreseen this consequence;" or (C) "From everything I
knew at the time, this did not seem like t -le probable
result of my actions."
Working back from these commonly accepted excuses, we
can begin to sketch out the criteria commonly (although
tacitly) used for deciding moral agency.
Judging from A, intentions apparently play a
significant part in our decisions concerning moral
agency. So large a part that events caused by an agent
but not intended (and not able to be avoided) are not
acts for which we hold a person morally responsible.
8
We may, therefore, say that if a subject cannot act
intentionally, in some way exercise its will, then it
cannot be held morally responsible for the events it
causes. It does not qualify as a moral. agent.
At the core of the concept of moral agency we operate
out of in our daily lives is the capability of acting
intentionally.
Is our task complete?
Not yet. What we originally set out to do was to
define the criteria that separate those we consider
morally responsible from those we do not. As Christopher
Meyers points out in his article "The Corporation, its
Members and Moral Accountability,"3 intentionality as
simply formulated will not do the trick. As now defined,
higher non-moral animals for instance, are not eliminated
from the group cf moral agents.
What distinguishes intentional moral action from the
sort of intentional actions we attribute to tilose
entities (like dogs or gorillas) that we would
nonetheless not identify as moral agents is a mental
state that Meyers terms "second order intentionality."
Borrowing from Daniel Dennett, Meyers characterizes
second order intentionality, or "reciprocity" (Dennett's
term), as the capacity not only to have intentions
3Christopher Meyers, "The Corporation, Its Members,
an,1 Moral Acountability," Business & Professional Ethics
Jourrial, Ill (Fall 1983), 36.
9
desires and beliefs, but also the ability to have
Intentions, desires and beliefs about some other entities
(or one's own) intentions, desires and beliefs. It is the
capacity to participate in the reciprocity that is part
and parcel of moral relationships.
This kind of intentionality is important in morality
because in order to hold an individual accountable,
we must be able to say 3/he (or it) must first, have
been capable of taking other moral agents' concerns
into account. It is precisely when such concerns are
either not considered and should have been, or when
such concerns are considered with malevolence, that
we say the agent was morally suspect. If an entity
is incapable of considering another's concerns, if it
does not possess second order intentionality, it is
morally illegitimate to nonetheless hold it
accountable for how its actions affect another's
concerns. And second, after fulfilling the first
condition, the entity must be able to reflect back on
its intention
4
and determine whether to go ahead with
the action."
Meyers would also add as a second necessary condition
of moral agency, that an entity must exist in moral
relationships with others. This, however, seems to me to
he implicit in the notion of second order intentionality
or perhaps more exactly in the exercise of it.
Second order intentionality entails considering my
Intentions, desires and beliefs as well as those of other
moral agents before acting. Since this type of
reciprocal action 13 required of all members of the moral




Meyers also contends that as a necessary result of
his two criteria, an agent must be an "individual, a
single entity to whom moral ascriptions can be
as igned."
6 
There must be someone or somethini to whom
we assign praise or guilt.
We may in some instances speak of holding a group of
people responsible for some event, but what we are really
saying is that each and every member of the group is
responsible. Moral responsibility is the sort of thing
that is unique to individuals.
Still other philosophers would add additional
conditions, or modify those we have outlined for
application to corporations. But they all, it will be
shown, are either wrongheaded notions or contained in the
conditions we have outlined.
The necessary and sufficient conditions then for
moral agency, the criteria that must be met in order to
be able to properly ascribe praise or blame to an entity
are
1. second order intentionality and
2. individuality
Now we must consider if corporations meet our
criteria of moral agency. In order to do so we will
examine six different schools of thought on the matter,
beginning with what I shall call the reductionist point
of view.
5Ibid., 38. 6ibid., 39.
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According to Milton Friedman, the most well-known
proponent of the reductionist school of thought,
corporations fail on the second of the two standards set
out above.7
Corporations, says Friedman, don't act, individual
employees do; and it is those individual employees who
have moral responsibilities, chiefly to the corporate
stockholders.
On the opposite end of the spectrum are philosophers
Peter French, David Ozar and Kenneth Goodpaster, who
contend that corporations, through their internal
decision making structures, incorporate individual wills
into a corporate will. Under this view corporations are
full-fledged moral persons.
8
7Milton Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of
Business," in Ethical Theory and Business, ed. by Tom L.
Beauchamp and Norman F. BOVre--TEnglewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1979), p.60; IdeT., "The Social
Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits,"
in Moral Issues In Business, ed. by Vincent Barry
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1983), p.
8
Peter A. French, "Corporate Moral Agency," in ed.
[Ethical Theory and  Business] by Tom L. Beauchamp and
Norman E. Bowie (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1979); Idem, "The Corporation As A Moral Person," in
Ethical Theory and Business, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp and
Norman F. Bowie, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1979); p.207
Kenneth E. Goodpaster, "The Concept of Corporate
Responsibility," in Just Business, ed. by Tom Regan (New
York: Random House, 1984):Idem, and John B. Matthews, Jr.
"Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?," Harvard Business 
Review, (September-October 1984) 41-50; Goodpaster,
"Morality and Formality Organizations," in Ethical Issues
In Business, ed. by Thomas Donaldson and Patricia
Werhane, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979)
12
According to the structural restraint or mechanistic
theory, here represented by John Ladd and Patricia
Werhane, corporations are indeed structured in such a way
as to incorporate the actions of individual employees,
but they also have limited, specific goals, and only
actions that are made according to the decision making
rules and directed toward the corporate goal(s) count as
corporate actions.9 Considerations not directly
related to these limited, usually financial goals, are
irrelevant in making decisions. Like computers,
corporations are programmed to attain a certain state of
affairs and cannot "compute" moral factors.
All the views outlined above, points out Thomas
Donaldson, are based on models of corporate behavior.
None of them, he contends, are always accurate
descriptions of the way in which each particular
corporation operates. Some models will fit well in
reference to some corporations and some to others, but no
one model will fit every corppration at all times.
10
So, says Donaldson, we must judge each corporation
individually to see what model fits it best, and based on
9Simeon M. Kriesberg, "Decision Making Models and
the Control of Corporate Crime," The Yale  Law Journal,
85 (July 1976), 109-146; Patricia Hogue Werhane, ifir-OFmal
Organizations, Economic Freedom and Moral Agency,"
Journal of Value Inquiry, XIV (Spring, 1980) 43-49.
10
Thomas Donaldson, Corp' , tion. and Morality,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prer i-17=n11, 1975-7.
13
that model decide if that particular corporation
qualifies as a moral agent.
While Larry May also agrees that models can give us
insight into how corporations operate, he suggests they
can also mislead. A corporation can be said to act (in
some sense of the phrase), but only indirectly through
its appointed agents. Corporations are morally
responsible, but only in a way roughly analogous to
full-fledged moral persons.11
The importance of what model of corporate behavior
one bases their theory of moral agency on is highlighted
by the writings of organizational theorist Michael
Keeley. All of the theories presented above (with the
exception of Friedman, and we will deal with him
separately) are flawed, says Keeley, in that they are
based on one or another organismic or goal-oriented
model. He cites many criticisms of goal oriented models,
the most telling of which is that it is impossible to
distinguish so called corporate goals, from the goals
participants in the corporation have for it. With no
distinct corporate goals, there is no corporate will and
hence no intentional action or moral agency.
12
11
Larry May, "Vicarious Agency and Corporate
Responsibility," Philosophical Studies, IVXIII (Spring
1983), 69-82.
12
Michael Keeley, "Organizations as Non-Persons,"
Journal of Value Inquiry, XV (Spring, 1981) 149-155.
14
Complex, formal organizations like corporations are
better understood through a social contract model,
suggests Keeley. While this model does not allow for
corporate moral agency, Keeley contends that that does
not mean we cannot pass moral judgments on the results of
corporate activities.
THE REDUCTIONIST VIEW
Are corporations the sorts of entities to which it is
proper to ascribe blame or praise? Do corporations meet
our criteria for moral agency?
The reductionist answer to both questions, as found
in the writings of Robert Holmes and Milton Friedman, is
a definite no. Their argument is simple. Corporations
can't have moral responsibilities because corporations
aren't persons, and only persons, "living, rational
beings,"
13 
can have moral responsibilities or be the
proper objects of moral praise or blame.
I have termed this view "reductionist," because,
according to Holmes and Friedman, corporate actions,
decisions, intentions and moral responsibility are
reducible to the actions, decisions, intentions and moral
responsibilities of the individual persons that make it
Up.
Thus there is no advantage, writes Holmes, to
hypostatizing corporations, they have life only
through the choices and decisions of individual
pnv.sons. We nevertheless do speak corporations as
though they were persons, and there is no harm in
this so long as it is understood that such talk must
be transposable into statements about the conduct of
individuals -- not necessarily without remainder, but
with sufficient completeness to enable us to
13
May, "Vicarious Agency," p.153.
15
16
formulate the appropriate moral judgements about the
latter. 14
The argument seems powerful in its simplicity. It
moves forcefully to its conclusion, not burdened by the
baggage of arguments in support of its premises.
Holmes and Friedman seem to think it self-evident
that "corporations aren't persons" and that "only persons
can have moral responsibilities." But as the mere
presence of plausible arguments to the contrary show,
that is not the case.
With no arguments in support of their case, we are
forced to try to piece together their reasons for holding
these positions from the hints they have given us in
their writings.
The basis for Friedman's and Holmes' position that
corporations are not persons is based on the commonly
held "legal fiction" interpretation of the legal status
of corporations as persons.
15 This interpretation
holds that legal persons are the creation of the law. As
Peter French writes: "The theory does not view the law as




Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of Business
is to Increase Its Profits," 62.
17
persons; it argues that the law creates its own
subjects. 
16
But as French and others have pointed out the legal
status of an entity has little to tell us about its moral
status (except perhaps as prima facie evidence). For
under the law, a juristic person need not necessarily be
an agent. In the law, being a holder of rights is
contrasted with being an administrator of rights; as for
instance, in the case of human beings who have died or
are yet unborn, both of which have in different instances
been granted rights under the law, but neither of which
can exercise them. If they are to continue to hold this
position it must be on other grounds than on appeal to
legal theory. To do this, one would need to delineate
the criteria for personhood, and then clarify the concept
and show that corporations do not meet those criteria.
Of course, what they may be claiming
corporations aren't persons is that they
beings, the implication being that being
a necessary condition for moral agency.
not seem self-evident.
When we use the term moral agent we are most often
referring to a human being. But to preclude any other
entity from moral agency, simply because it is not a




a human being is
Again, this does
16
French, "The Corporation As A Moral Person," p. 212.
18
One would like to give Holmes, a professional philo-
sopher, the benefit of the doubt on this point. But, he
makes it difficult. First, he doesn't seek to distance
himself from what one would think is a possible misinter-
pretation of the statement. Secondly, in his own state-
ment on this point, he uses the term "living, rational
beings" for "persons," which seems to be a veiled way of
saying human beings.
Even if it is not, the claim that corporations are
not "living, rational beings," seems no more self-evident
than the claim that corporations aren't persons. The
burden of proof for this assumption lies with Holmes, as
well as some explanation for why being a living, rational
being has anything to do with whether an entity is a
moral agent.
More directly related to the question of whether
corporations meet our criteria for moral agency is the
claim that corporate actions, decision and intentions are
reducible to those of the people "who stand in the appro-
priate relations to them [corporations] (e.g., as
directors, managers, stockholders)."
17
If all so-called corporate actions are actually more
accurately described as the actions of a corporation's
members, then there are no corporate intentions; and if
there are no corporate intentions, then corporations are
17
May, "Vicarious Agency," p. 153.
19
not moral agents. Again, no support is given for the
claim that corporate actions are reducible to the actions
of its members.
Holmes does present one pragmatic argument. He
suggests that nothing is gained by attributing actions or
decisions to corporations since ther3 are no moral
obligations that "wouldn't bear equally" on corporate
members and the corporation alike.
Holmes would seem to be saying that even if corpora-
tions could be said to have moral responsibilities that
the obligation for living up to them would fall upon the
employees or board or stockholders since corporations can
only be said to act "through the choices and decisions of
individual persons. 
18
But what Holmes (and Friedman) fail to appreciate is
the difference between acting as an agent for someone or
something else, and acting for one's self. Corporate
structure sets up official relationships whereby the acts
and decisions of individuals or groups of individuals in
certain authorized positions (not necessarily, or
exclusively executives) count as the acts and decisions
of the corporation.
It has become almost a cliche to say that the sum is
more than the whole of the parts, but when originally




observation based on the study of organizations. And
theobservation still holds true, individuals acting in
concert can do more than the same individuals acting
separately.
This is no less true for corporations than for any
other organization. To use French's well known
hypothetical example, there is something deficient in
describing Gulf Oil Co.'s decision to join a uranium
cartel (a decision made by a committee of three
executives) as corporate executive X, corporate executive
Y and corporate executive Z each deciding Gulf Oil
Company should join the cartel.
Holmes, in fact, recognizes this when, as noted
earlier, he writes that it is fine to talk about
corporations acting or deciding as long as we understand
that such talk must be transposable into statements
about the conduct of individuals not necessarily
without remainder, but with sufficient completeness
to enable us to formulate the appropriate moral
judgements about the latter.19
The key phrase is "not necessarily without
remainder." This is not a matter to be measured. Either
the decisions or actions of individuals or groups of
individuals in the appropriate relationships to a
corporation are more than simply the aggregate of the
decisions of the individuals themselves or they are not.
And if they are in some sense "more," whatever
19Ibid.
21
exactly that may mean, then Holmes and Friedman are
wrong, and so-called corporate actions or decisions are
not reducible to the actions or decisions of those who
make up the corporation.
Does this qlean, contrary to Friedman's and Holmes'
basic contention, that corporations do qualify as moral
agents. Not necessarily. Whatever the "more" we have
discussed is, we certainly haven't established that it is
in any sense a corporate intention or will. What we have
shown thus far is that the reductionist view is an
untenable position (at least, that Holmes nor Friedman
have advanced compelling arguments for it). We next turn
to a position almost 180 degrees from the reductionist
view, the moral person view, as advanced by Peter French,
David Ozar and Kenneth Goodpaster.
THE MORAL PERSON VIEW
Peter French
The moral person view has received its classic
statement in Peter French's article, "The Corporation as
a Moral Person,u20 but has also appeared in several
variations in the writings of other philosophers,
including Kenneth Goodpaster and David Ozar.21
Briefly stated, the moral person theory holds that
corporations are full-fledged members of the moral
community, in French's terms, moral persons, with all the
attendant rights and responsibilities.
Corporations, moral person theorists maintain,
achieve a certain identity or individuality through their
decision making structures, frameworks that mold the
decisions, actions and intentions of individuals into a
single corporate deciqion, action or intention.
To properly examine this position it will be
necessary to examine the writings of each of the
proponents we have mentioned individually. We will begin
20
French has advanced his position in several other
articles as well. See the bibliography for a partial
listing.
12
- It should be noted that the category "Moral
Person View" is the creation of Thomas Donaldson which I
have borrowed. While French would most likely not have a




with the champion and originator of the position, Peter
French.
As a fir 6:; step in understanding French's argument,
it will he helpful to be familiar with the way in which
he uses the term "moral person."22 French defines a
moral person "as the referent of any proper name or
description that can be a non-eliminatable subject of
what I shall call...a responsibility ascription of the
second type."
23
Responsibility ascriptions of the
second type focus on intentions, pointing up the
distinction between simply being the cause of an event
and in some sense being the agent of it.
French quotes J. L. Austin on this point: "In
considering responsibility, few things are more important
than to establish whether a man intended to do A or
ahether he did A intentionally."24 The minimum
required of a subject in order for it to be capable of
22It should be noted that French claims certain
metaphysical attributes for mora persons that I have not
claimed for moral agents. However, the arguments French
offers and that we shall examine for considering
corporations as moral persons deal primarily with the
criteria we have suggested for moral agents, rather than the
metaphysical properties he associates with moral
personhood. Therefore, I will give little attention to his
claim that corporations possess certain metaphysical
attributes associated with persons.
23
French, "The Corporation As A Moral Person," p. 210.
24French, "Corporate Moral Agency," p. 185.
24
this type of action, is what French calls non-
eliminatable Davidsonian agency, and this is where our
criteria for being a member of the moral community
diverge.
The primary attribute of a Davidsonian agent, as far
as I can tell for French does not define it, is a simple
kind of intentionality of the sort we attribute to
higher, non-moral animals. French writes that "...the
possibility of describing something as an agent depends
upon whether or not it can be properly described as
having done something for a reason."25 And as we have
already seen, this is not a complete enough exploration
of the kind of intentionality involved in moral agency.
"...for a corporation to be treated as a Davidsonian
agent it must be the case that some things happen,
some events, are describable in a way that makes
certain sentences true, sentences that say that some
of the things a corporation does were intended by the
corporation itself...," as distinct from the
intentions of "the biological persons who comprise
[it], e.g., its board of directors."26
The device French proposes to allow such a
description is what he calls a Corporation's Internal
Decision or CID structure. The CID structure is meant to
illuminate the ways in which corporations have intentions
and make decisions.
25Ibid.




The two elements that help spell out how this happens
in a corporation are i) the organizational or
responsibility flow chart that delineates stations and
levels within the corporate power structure, and 2)
corporate or internal recognition rules that all')w
recognition of when a decision has been made for
corporate reasons.
The organizational chart makes clear the relation-
ships that hold in a corporation. The recognition rules
(which may be formal or informal) are made up of
"procedural recognitors," rules about how decisions are
to be reached and by whom (what positions on the
organizational chart), and corporate policy or beliefs.
Corporate policies, beliefs or goals are "encrusted
in the precedent of previous corporate actions and its
statement of purpose as recorded in its certificate of
incorporation, annua] reports, etc."
27
If a decision is made in Tine with established
procedure then it can be said to be a corporate
decision. For example, let us say that in Gulf Oil
Company's CID structure unanimous decisions made by the
individuals in positions A, B and C on the organizational
chart count as decisions made by the corporation. Then a
unanimous decision by the individuals in those positions
(regardless of their motivation for so deciding) to join
27-rrench, "Corporate Moral Agency," p. 132.
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an international uranium cartel can be described as Gulf
Oil Corporation deciding to join the cartel.
It is the CID structure in its procedural
recognitors, says French, that allows us to see what
otherwise is not seen. It "licenses the descriptive
transformation of events, seen under another aspect as
the acts of biological persons...to corporate acts by
exposing the corporate character of those events."28
The CID structure, in French's terms, synthesizes and
subordinates individual wills into a corporate will; it
"incorporates acts of biological persons."
29 This
alone, however, doesn't establish corporate
1ntentionality.30 Corporate actions must also be
performed in accord with corporate policies or goals in
order for there to be a corporate intentional act.
"Simply, when the corporate act is consistent with,
an instantation or an implementation of corporate
policy, then it is proper to describe it as having
been done for corporate reasons, as having been
caused by a corporate desire coupled with a corporate
belief and so on, in other words, as corporate
intentional."31
This "redescriptive device," to use French's term,
reveals corporate actions, decisions and intentions where
212.
28French, "The Corporation As A Moral Person,
29
Ibid., 222.
30 31Ibid, 213. Ibid.
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we had seen only individual intentions, actions and
decisions. They are two, non-identical aspects of the
same event. In this sense, corporations can be said to
be individual entities, with attributes not reducible to
those individuals who make them up.
So, it seems, corporations do meet our requirements
for moral agency and can properly be considered
full-fledged participants in the moral community.
But, thorough and insightful as his argument is,
there are problems with French's position.
It will be recalled that French's conception of
intentionality was found to be deficient because it fails
to exclude the type of "intentional" actions we sometimes
attribute to dogs and cats.
Under Christopher Meyers guidance, we suggested
"second order intentionality" as a more appropriate
criteria for moral agPncy. What distinguishes second
order intentionality from the concept French proposed is
the capacity to reflect on the effect of one's intended
action on the desires and beliefs of other. 
Thereis a serious question in my mind whether
French's redescriptive device, the CIDs, can be stretched
to cover this kind of reflective thought. Meyers thinks
it can.
Meyers' example of a typical corporate-level decision
of the second order type is of American Airlines lowering
its transcontinental flight fare. "It does so," writes
28
Meyers, "with due consideration of how it will affect the
desires or intentions of competitors, consumers,
regulators, etc."32 If Eastern threatens a price war,
American will calculate the cost and probably back off.
But is this really the type of thought we are talking
about in second order intentionality? Is the simple,
cold calculation of how one's actions will affect others
all that is required of moral thinking? Or, is there
something more, not only considering, but having
empathy. I suggest the moral point of view involves more
than calculating how my actions will eventually affect me
through the reactions of others. And if this is true can





activities of individuals in
corporation itself thinking,
What recognitor or
a redescription of the
the corporation as the
feeling or empathizing.
Perhaps it would make some sense to call the gathering of
information and deliberation that goes into a corporate
decision, the corporate thought process. But in any
literal sense? Surely, now we must be speaking
figuratively. If we don't take such statements
literally, are we really, as French would claim, guilty
of an anthropocentric bias? Or is French simply
determined to interpret a model of organizational
32
Meyers, "Tne Corporation, Its Members, and Moral
Accountability," p. 37.
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behavior based on the behavior of persons, as a literal
description, regardless of how far the model must be
stretched?
At any rate, there are other problems with his posi-
tion. According to French, decisions made in accordance
with CID structure, corporate decisions, are not yet
examples of corporate will. In order for a decision to
be an example of corporate will, in order for it to be
"proper to describe it as having been done for corporate
reasons,"33 it must not only have been made in accor-
dance with CID structure, but also must be "consistent
with an instantiation or an implementation of "estab-
lished corporate policy."
34
In other words, corporate
decisions or actions must in some sense be in accordance
with established corporate policy in order for them to
count as intentional acts of the corporation.
This seems to leave open the possibility of corporate
actions or decisions that are not tne intentions of the
corporation. And if corporate policy is at least morally
neutral, then it seems any immoral act or decision would
not qualify as an intentional action of the corporation,
thereby eliminating the possibility of immorality on the
part of a corporation whose "personality" is basically
moral.





French's formula seems to allow no room for
wrongdoing by such a corporation, for deviations from the
corporate character, any action that does not conform
with "corporate policy" is automatically disqualified as
an intentional act of the corporation.
Lest this seem like too far-fetched a criticism of
French's position, consider again the types of things
that French cites as representative of corporate policy,
"the precedent of previous corporate actions35 and a
corporation's "statements of purpose as recorded in its
certificate of incorporation, annual reports, etc."
36
I have yet to see an official corporate statement that
doesn't set high moral standards. As Michael Keeley has
pointed out, most organizational theorists maintain that
such official statements serve more as public relations
propaganda than as guides to conduct.
Philosopher Larry May challenges French's position on
other grounds. May makes a distinction between "acts of
will" and "consensual or cooperative decisions."37 He
contends that the process of decision making French
describes as the subordination and synthesis of
individual wills into a corporate will, is actually
350ne would assume that previous corporate actions
also are defined by the CIDs' qualified act + policy r.
intentional act equation.
36
French, "The Corporation As A Moral Person,"
214.
37May, "Vicarious Agency," p. 70.
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nothing more than the achievement of a consensus in
which, as in French's Gulf Oil example, each executive
alters his or her will, but in no sense gives it up.38
While French might agree that in one sense there is a
consensus of wills, he would go on to claim the device he
has proposed allows us to see another aspect of the same
event, without denying the aspect May describes. The CID
structure licenses a redescription of the same event as
the corporation deciding, as a willful act of the
corporation.
But there is a large leap from describing an event,
speaking of an event as the corporation deciding, and the
corporation literally deciding in the sense that human
beings are said to decide. The former is an analogy; the
latter is a description of a metaphysical condition.
And, as we have seen, there are some very serious
problems with the latter.
The last criticism of French's position we will
consider is advanced by organizational theorist Michael
Keeley. Keeley's criticism focuses on the notion of
corporate goals or corporate policies, a notion crucial
to French's redescription of events as corporate
intentional.
Keeley points out that the types of official
statements that French cites as evidence of corporate
38 Ibid., 71.
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goals have generally been considered by organizational
theorists to be "at best misleading," calculated more to
secure societal approval and the commitment of particular
corporate participants than to guide corporate
actions.39
Also, suggests Keeley, there is a theoretical problem
with distinguishing goals of a corporation (what the
organization itself wants) from goals for a corporation
(what the people associated with the corporation want).
We will have much more to say about this later when we
consider Keeley's criticism of goal-based theories of
organizational behavior. For now, it will suffice to
quote Keeley on the importance of the distinction:
Now, it may be possible to identify [goals for an
organization] by questioning organizational
participants, and it may be possible to identify [the
consequences of an organization] by observing their
behavior. But it is not apparent that the...goals of
an organization, which are supposed in the
social-person view...can be identified by any means.
If, in fact, truly organizational goals or intentions
defy identification, there is not much point in
pretending that they exist or that organizations
resemble persons in any significant way.40
French's theory has then been found deficient in
several ways:
1. It leaves as a possibility the strange circumstance
that a corporation with morally upright corporate




policies might not be able to commit a morally
Irresponsible act.
2. While the CID structure suggests a reasonable way in
which to attribute a simple sort of intentionality to
corporations, it seems Inadequate to the task of
showing us in what way a corporation could be said to
have the empathy and reflective thought associated
with second-order intentionality.
3. As Larry May points out, what French wants to call a
process of synthesis and subordination of individual
wills into a metaphysical corporate intentional will,
is actually nothing more than the process of
compromise and consent by which any group reaches a
decision.
4. According to Michael Keeley, corporate goals, (what
Keeley terms "goals of an organization") don't
operate in the real corporate world in the way French
suggests they do, and, in fact, may not exist at all.
Kenneth Goodpaster also argues that corporations are
moral persons, but arrives at that conclusion by a
different reasoning process than French. First, I will
outline his position and then check to see if it is
subject to the same objections as was French's argument.
THE MORAL PERSON VIEW
Kenneth E. Goodpaster
Goodpaster's program is much different than that of
French, although their position on the moral status of
corporations is much the same. In all of Goodpaster's
writings with which I am familiar, he is more concerned
with the framework of moral behavior and how it can be
applied to corporations than in providing justification
for considering corporations as moral agents.
Agency, according to Goodpaster, lies in the
capability to take the moral point of view. A capability
which he assumes corporations capable of when he projects
the processes associated with the moral responsibility of
persons to the level of organizations. "Our proposed
frame of reference for thinking about implementing
corporate responsibility aims at spelling out the
processes associated with the moral responsibility of
individuals and projecting them to the level of
organizations."
41
This is justified according to Goodpaster, because of
an analogy that holds between organizations and persons.
4n analogy that he bases on the example of corporations
acting as single entities, as individuals. "For," writes
41
Goodpaster and Matthews, "Can a Corporation Have
a Conscience?," p. 43.
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Goodpaster, "if a group can act like a person in some
ways, then we can expect it to behave like a person in
other ways. For one thing, we know that people organized
into a group can act as a unit.
u42 The traits to be
projected from persons to corporations are what
Goodpaster defines as the two aspects of the moral point
of view: rationality and respect.
Rationality involves a:
lack of impulsiveness, care in mapping out alterna-
tives and consequences, clarity about goals and
purposes, and attention to the details of
implementation...
And respect involves:
...a special concern for the effects of one's
decisions and policies on others, special in the
sense that it goes beyond...seeing others merely as
Instrumental to accomplishing one's own purposes.43
These are behaviors very similar to what T outlined
as second order intentionality. In fact, Goodpaster's
definitions might be said to fle4h out the concept. With
these kind of traits In mind, Coodpaster suggests that
ccoporations that do such things as
monitor their employment practices and the effects of




Goodpaster, "Corporate Responsibility," p. 134.
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environment and human health show the same kind of
rationality and respect that morally responsible
individuals do. Thus, attributing actions,
strategies, decisions, and moral responsibilities to
oorporations as entities distinguishable from those
who hold offices in them poses no problem.44
This is not a surprising conclusion. But several of
Goodpaster's moves are rather suspect.
Firs , although Goodpaster insists his view does not
involve speaking of corporations as moral persons in any
literal sense, this is exactly what he does.
45
Goodpaster states very clearly that he means to use
human moral agency as a model for corporate moral
behavior. However, in his zeal to make his point, he
steps over the bounds of the analogy to declare that
corporations are moral persons and proper subjects of
moral predicates.
In "Can a Corporation Have a Conscience"
46 in
particular, Goodpaster claims that corporations who take
actions similar to those we associate with morally
responsible persons, show
the same kind of rationality and respect that morally
responsible individuals do. Thus, attributing
actions, strategies, decisions and moral
responsibility to corporations as entities
distinguishable from those who hold offices in them
poses no problem.47
44Ibid.Goodpaster and Mathews, "Can a Corporation







There is a significant and unjustified move from the
fact that certain similarities exist between the sorts of
things corporations do and the sort of things moral
persons do to the conclusion that corporations are moral
persons.
In this one very suspect move, Goodpaster has gone
from making an analogy between individuals and
corporations to stating that corporations are moral
agents.
It is one thing to say something is analogous to
something else; it is quite another to say it is of the
same kind, that is, that it is of the same species.
Moreover, although Goodpaster speaks of it as simply
one example of the several ways in which corporations are
like persons, the supposed capability of corporations to
act as single entities plays a much more crucial role in
his argument. In fact, I suggest that the very
possibility of Goodpaster's overall analogy depends on
it.
Certainly this is what Goodpaster is referring to
when he writes: "...if a group can act like a person in
some ways, then we can expect it to behave like a person
in other ways."
48 Furthermore, we must be able to
stretch the analogy to all the ways of thinking and




The centrality of the notion of intentional action to
the concept of moral personhood requires that any subject
which we would want to speak of as analogous to human
persons must be analogous on this key point.
This sort of intentional ation, Goodpaster claims,
entails acting as a single entity. And this, he says,
groups can do. Appealing to French, Goodpaster writes
that corporations have rules and structures that tell us
when actions of individuals in the corporation count as
actions of the corporation itself.
49
But, as we have already seen, problems with French's
account of Corporate Internal Decision structures show
the view to be somewhat removed from corporate reality
and far too optimistic about the sort of unity that
Goodpaster suggests is the outcome of these structures.
In addition, Keeley's criticism about corporate goals
(which we will examine more fully later in this paper)
makes the existence of so-called corporate actions
doubtful. And if corporations can't properly be said to
act as individual entities, corporations cannot be said,
even analogously, to take the moral point of view; and it
is very difficult to make much sense out of an analogy
between moral persons and corporations.
THE MORAL PERSON VIEW
David Ozar
David Ozar's position may more appropriately be
termed the moral agent view. His terminology is closer
to the terminology I have proposed in this paper than to
French's. However, his conclusions are very close to
French's.
Very simply, Ozar argues that in order to hold any
group responsible for its actions we must be able to say
it can act as a single entity as opposed to the members
that constitute it. There are certain circumstances
under which we do speak of clubs and nations in just that
way, says Ozar, and if clubs and nations, why not
corporations.
This is admittedly a slight oversimplification of
Ozar's argument. He does give an account of the
circumstances in which we speak of clubs or nations as
acting as single entities, circomstances very similar but
not as detailed as French's. It is rules, informal and
formal, accepted by the persons involved in a given
organization (explicitly or tacitly) that define when an




Corporations also have such "recognition" rules.
Therefore, Ozar concludes, it is reasonable to hold
corporations morally responsible for their actions in the
same way as clubs or nations."
What is missing in Ozar's position is any account of
why we should equate actions that we normally count as
the action of a group as a single entity with the type of
intentionality that is required of moral agency.
Ozar himself is explicit about this:
The argument offered here is that corporations
fulfill the conditions we actually use to judge
whether a group can be considered to be a single
entity in the performance of actions. It does not
attempt to answer the more difficult question of why
these conditions are appropriate, i.e., why the
acceptance of certain sorts of rules justifies us
in attributing agency to a group as a single
entity.51
Even if he were to offer an argument to support his
case, the similarity of Ozar's explanation of the process
through which a decision of individuals becomes the
decision of a corporatio,1 to Freuch's CIDs suggests that
50David T. Ozar, "The Moral Responsibilities of
Corporations," in Ethical Issues  in Business, ed. Thomas
Donaldson and ?att.-n-1-a Werhane (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 298.
51 Ibid., p. 300.
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a more fully developed position would be subject to many
of the same criticisms as French.
One final criticism of the moral person view comes in
the form of the next view we shall consider. According
to the Structural Restraint position, Ozar and the other
moral person theorists have done well to concentrate on
corporate structure, but they have misunderstood its
relevance to corporate moral agency.
THE STRUCTURAL RESTRAINT VIEW
John Ladd and Patricia Werhane are the two most well
known proponents of what Thomas Donaldson has called the
"Structural Restraint" view.
Briefly, they hold that corporations are
goal-achieving machines, and just as it would be
ridiculous to demand that machines behave morally, so it
is foolish to call for corporations to be morally
responsible.
A corporation is restrained by its structures from
taking moral considerations into account in its
decision-making. They are set-up to achieve a particular
end or set of ends, and all that counts is how to achieve
that end most efficiently.
Ladd claims that corporations are of the class of
"formal organizations." Formal organizations in turn are
defined as "decision making structures;" which is to say
they are constructs designed to achieve certain
predefined goals by appropriating the actions and
decisions of their members as their own.
52
52John Ladd, "Morality and the Ideal of Rationality
in Formal Organizations," in Ethical Issues in Business,
ed. by Thomas Donaldson and Patricia WJFETIne (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 117.
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This is achieved by rules that define when a decision
or action of corporate employees counts as a decision or
action of the corporation, thereby achieving a clear cut
distinction between decisions employees make for the
corporation and decisions they make for themselves.
Organizational or social decisions, as they are
called by Ladd, are decisions "related" to organizational
goals.53 Any decision made by a corporate employee
that doesn't further the achievement of the corporate
goals counts as a personal decision.
So far, the argument sounds much like that of the
moral person argument, but this is where the similarity
ends.
In contrast to Ozar, Werhane points out that although
there is a surface-level similarity in the way in which
clubs, nations and corporations make decisions, the
relationship of corporate members to the corporation is
much different from that of members of a club or nation.
Clubs or nations exist, in some sense, for the good
of their members, and their memoers count as ends in
their decisions. Corporations, however, exist for the
pursuit of impersonal goals, unrelated to their members
44
(at least not as members) and their members count only as
means to those impersonal ends.
Rule governed behavior, says Werhane, does not
necessarily imply moral agency.
54 Actions taken by
corporate members for the corporation, that is to say,
corporate actions, are not what we have called
second-order intentional. They are much more like
intentions of the first order. They are not character-
ized by reflection on the effects of the action on the
goals of others.
As in playing a game, corporate decisions must be
made according to the rules and must, in order to be
intelligible, be made to achieve the goal of the game,
e.g., as in chess, to checkmate the opponents king.
65
Unlike French, Ladd is willing to accept the
consequences of defining corporate intentional acts as
only those that are made in accordance with corporate
goals. In fact, he claims that for an organization to
make a decision not related to one of its goals would be
tantamount in a chess game to knocking the pieces off the
chess board and claiming that as your move.
56
It would, says Ladd in an appeal to Wittgenstein,
under the rules of that particular language game be
54
Werhane, "Formal Organizations," p. 44,45.





irrational. Additionally, a move made in the game 13
Isolated from criticism based on criteria other than the
rules and goals of the game itself. Moves made within
the game are "logically autonomous."57
In the same sense then, it would be irrational for a
corporation to make any decision not directly related to
the achievement of corporate ends. For Ladd and Werhane,
rationality is determined by whether or not a decision is
"efficient in pursuing a desired goal, whatever that.
might be."58
Furthermore, what a corporation's goals happen to be,
regardless of tne moral value we as moral agents may
place on them, have nothing to do with its moral status.
For, as Werhane and Ladd have defined it, rationality is
morally neutral to the corporations' goals.
"Thus," writes Werhane,"as Ladd writes in his paper,
corporations are structured very much like machines.
Corporate rules and procedures, like the design and
structure of a machine, are set up to achieve
external economic ends rather than designed in
relation to, or as a consequence of member
employees...Therefore, while corporate activities are
governed, these rules, as impersonal operating
procedures, preclude rather than imply moral
agency. "59
So it seems, once we grant Ladd and Werhane that
corporations are formal organizations and that formal
57Ibid., 103. 
58Ibid., 106.
59Werhane, °Formal Organizations," p. 45.
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organizations are as they have defined them, that their
argument grinds inexorably toward its conclusion. They
may be capable of activity as a single entity, but not of
the type of reciprocal action we have said is a necessary
condition of agency. Corporations fall short of our
criteria for moral agency.
But, their premises are not so obvious as Ladd and
Werhane assume. The concept of a formal organization is
just one model for understanding corporate behavior; and
whether corporations fit this model is an empirical
matter. But, this is a question we will return to.
As airtight as their argument seems, several
philosophers have advanced criticisms internal to the
argument.
Kenneth Goodpaster, whose own views we examined
earlier, has taKen Ladds challenge to the
intelligibility of the moral person view head-on in his
article, "Morality and Formal Organizations. 
6o
Goodpaster accepts Ladd's premise that organizational
rationality has a pure means-to-end component, but posits
that in reality the ends are rarely unalterable. Given
this, he proposes that rationality as the efficient
pursuit of goals must be amended to include the scrutiny
and modification of those ends. And, it is in relation
60Goodpaster, "Morality and Formal Organizations."
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to the task of such scrutiny that Goodpaster sees the
relevance of moral principles.
61
However, as Thomas Donaldson has pointed out it is
just the sort of activity Goodpaster suggests in his
amendment to organizational rationality that Ladd has
claimed corporations aren't capable of. The structural
restraint argument, writes Donaldson, "claims that they
[corporations cannot be moral agents because they are
analogous to goal pursing machines, which are not
machines built to evaluate and challenge their own
goals. 
,,62
In effect, then, what Goodpaster has done is to
suggest that corporations don't function as Ladd and
Werhane have claimed. Again, this is a point we will
return to.
Goodpaster, along with Meyers, has also raised
serious questions about an analogy central to Ladd and
Werhane's position, the game analogy. Goodpaster
suggests that there are some serious disanalogies between
the rules of a game, in particular Ladd's example of
chess, and the organizational goals Ladd claims act as
the decision making premises for formal organizations.
Game rules, says Goodpaster, are relatively static,
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dynamic. Organizational goals shift considerably,
although possibly incrementally, over time due to
pressure from various interest groups inside and outside
the corporation.
63 For instance, as Berle and Means
pointed out more than 50 years ago, as effective control
of a corporation shifts from the board of directors to
the senior management, the primary goal shifts from
maximization of profits to organizational survival.
Maximization of profits becomes just one way to keep the
corporation alive.
Organizational theorist, Charles Perrow has even
provided an outline of how organizational goals change as
the organization matures and the power base shifts.
64
"By contrast, it would be surprising to find such
changes in the rules or objectives of chess over
time,"
65 
writes Goodpaster. The difference is due, he
claims, to the fact that unlike organizational decisions
moves in a game have very little impact on peoples lives
"I do not mean to suggest," writes Goodpaster, "that
the constitutive rules of chess do not, or have not,
undergone evolution. They clearly have. What is
important is that this evolution (a) has been very
slow since initial formulations of the game and (b)
has not been due to the impact of the game on the
63
Goodpaster, "Morality and Formal Organizations,"
p. 117.
64  Charles Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex
Organization," American Sociological  Review XXVI (Spring,
1961), 854-66.
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players or others' lives or well-being (since there
is next to no impact to speak of -- which is why
chess is only a game.)66
Christopher Meyers, and I along with him, offers
another criticism of Ladd's game analogy. Based on
Wittgenstein's views of language games, Ladd claims that
moves made within a game are immune to challenges based
on any criteria outside the game. In this sense,
organizational behavior, as analogous to a move in a game
is claimed to be shielded from moral considerations.
Wittgenstein, however, does not seem quite so
definitive about their being hard and fast lines between
language games. Words are given meaning by context in a
particular language game but yet are also used "sometimes
as it were between the games."
67
Language games are
not strict compartmentalized areas of activity in our
lives. They overlap, collide, and subsume or are
subsumed. A case can be made, I think, for saying that
the language game of morality is an all-pervasive game,
that it in some sense provides the background for all
other human activity. For instance, what is the concept
of cheating in chess or any other game? Is this not a
moral notion? From where within the game of chess does
this notion emanate?
66Ibid., 122.
67Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, (New York: Macmillan fublising Co.,
1958), p. 188.
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This is not the place to fully explore this idea. It
Is perhaps enough for our purposes to note that it is not
a logical impossibility for moral notions to be
Intelligible in any language game.
Meyers takes an even stronger stand on the subject:
"Given Wittgenstein's (to whom Ladd appeals)
discussion of the social context and its importance
to the make-up of particular language games, the
exclusion of moral considerations is altogether
illegitimate. "68
Whatever, the internal problems with Ladd's and
Werhane's positions, the really damning criticism of the
structural restraint view is that corporations simply do
not operate as they claim.
As I mentioned earlier, the category of formal
organizations is simply a descriptive model, and the
appropriateness of its application is a question open to
empirical inquiry. We have already seen at least one way
in which corporations differ from the model of formal
organizations in our discussion of the evolution of
corporate goals. In Donaldson's words, the structural
restraint view oversimplifies both what corporations are
and how they behave.
68
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THE CONDITIONAL VIEW
In his book, Corporations and Morality, Thomas
Donaldson examines two views we have looked at in this
paper, the Moral Person view and the Structural Restraint
view.
In his critique of the Structural Restraint view, he
states that the model oversimplifies corporate behavior.
As evidence he suggests a couple of other models of
corporate behavior and offers some examples of
hypothetical corporations that operate much differently
than the structural restraint view would suggest. Thus,
the structural restraint view of corporate behavior is
found to be an inadequate model on which to base a theory
of corporate moral status.
In fact, he seems to imply that no model would be
able to fit all corporations at all times. Any model
that claims to cover all corporations would be guilty
the same oversimplifications cuncerning corporate
structure and behavior as the structural restraint
model. Different corporations have different kinds of
decision making structures and cannot all be adequately




So, suggests Donaldson, we have been asking the wrong
questions:
"Instead of simply asking whether all corporations
are moral agents, or all corporations are not (thus
assuming that all corporations are one way or the
other), it would have been better to ask whether some
corporations are moral agents and some are not.69
The proper or more fruitful procedure, Donaldson
posits, would be to specify the conditions for moral
agency and then judge each corporation, one by one.
So far, I am inclined to agree with Donaldson,
although it should be noted that the claim that no
organizational model can adequately cover all corporate
behavior is itself open to empirical verification. The
fact that neither Donaldson nor I know of a model that
does the job certainly does not prove one doesn't or
couldn't exist.
However, even if such a comprehensive model did
exist, Donaldson's proposal would still be an acceptable
means by which to judge corporate moral status. In a
sense, it would be necessary to examine individual
corporations to see if they did in fact fit into any
given model's description of corporate behavior. So
69




perhaps it would be just as efficient to hold
 each
corporation up to the standards of moral a
gency one by
one as it would be to try to discern moral
 status by
models of organizational behavior.
But Donaldson's proposal is not so strai
ghtforward as
it would seem. Corporate moral agency, he cl
aims, "...is
of a special kind."70 It has its own sp
ecial
criteria. In order to qualify as a 
moral agent, a
corporation must, at minimum, possess:
1. the capacity to use moral norms in 
decision making;
2. the capacity of the decision maki
ng process to
control not only overt corporate act
s, but also the
structure of policies and rules.
If these criteria were simply a rest
atement of the
same requirements held for all agents in
 terms more
applicable to corporations, I might 
go along. But they
are not. What they are, in effect
 is a watering down of
the criteria for full-fledged agency.
Donaldson claims this special stat
us is necessary
because corporations (especially lar
ge ones) are not like
human beings mostly because of the
 bureaucracy inherent
in large organizations. For inst
ance, it is much more
difficult for a corporation to exe
cute its decisions to
act in such-and-such a way than 
it is for a human being.
70Ibid., 30.
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Based on the nature of large organizations, this
"bureaucratic model" holds
"that the crucial features of bureaucratization (i.e.,
rules, strata isolation, centralization,
professionalism, and complexity) create problems for
corporate responsibility, and these problems are
clearly different from those of individuals. This in
turn, suggests that for large corporations we must be
satisfied with a different and more complex model of
responsibility than for individuals."71
This does not seem to me to be the only possible
conclusion. In fact, I think there is a more obvious one
and that is that large bureaucratic corporations simply
do not qualify as moral agents.
I fail to see the value in establishing a lower class
of moral agency for corporations. The motivation seems
to be the justification of holding corporations
rerponsible for their acts. But there are other
alternatives. As we shall see when we examine the views
of Michael Keeley, just because corporations are not
moral agents does not mean they are shielded from moral




One of the most intriguing but least discussed models
of corporate behavior and moral agency is put forward by
Larry May. May contends that none of the views we have
considered so far are appropriate to describe the
behavior of corporations and as such do little to settle
the question of corporate moral status.
Contrary to what French says, corporations in May's
view are not capable of the sort of individual,
independent, intentional action that is a necessary
condition for moral agency. Neither are they the amoral
decision making machines that Ladd claims they are --
formal organizations whose employees' actions for the
corporation are clearly and absolutely distinct from
their acts as individuals.
Rather, suggests May, corporations have a rather
unique relationship with their employees that allows them
to act through the employees in a way that can best he
described as the corporation acting, a relationship
wrialogous to the relationship between an elected
political representative and his/her constituents.
In May's own words, "...corporations have the
peculiar property of only being able to act vicariously.
55
56
In virtue of this fact the fiction that corporations are
full-fledged moral agents should not be sustained.
Instead corporations should be given a distinct moral or
legal status of their own..."72
Rita C. Manning also suggests a version of a
vicarious sort of agency based on the analogy of the way
in which "lawyers act for their clients when they are
given the power of attorney."73 An analogy which she
unfortunately does not elaborate on. Although the idea
is not exclusively that of May, I will concentrate on his
position as the most fully articulated example of the
view.
In order to understand the nature of the relationship
May describes between a corporation and its employees,
and the type of unique moral status this suggests, it
will be helpful first to look at how May says it is
different from some of the views we've examined.
As we have already seen, May flatly rejects the
notion of corporations as full-fledged moral persons.
This is based on his rejection of French's account of
corporate intentions.
72May, "Vicarious Agency," p.69.
73Rita C. Manning, "Corporate Responsibility and
Corporate Personhood," Journal of Business Ethics, III
(1984), 79.
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In the corporate decision-making process, individual
wills are not somehow subsumed into a greater corporate
will. Actually, what happens is no different than in any
other group making a decision. In the process of
reaching a consensus, the individuals (at least some of
them) alter their original intentions or ideas. They
compromise in order to come up with a decision acceptable
to all.
French's account of corporate decision-making says
May, does not show that the decision-making should be
attributed to the corporation due to the subordination
and synthesis of wills instead of merely describing it as
"individual acts of varying and altering intentions in
order to achieve consensus and compromise between and
among members."
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This is not to say, however, that some actions of
individuals within the corporation are not better





not evidence of a corporate will.
issue with ,„add's descr_otion of
as unrealistic and far too narrow.
there is a hard and fast distinction
between acts performed by corporate employees for the
corporation and those performed by employees for
74  May, "Vicarious Agency," p. 72.
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themselves. Any act not in some sense related to the
attainment of a corporate goal is automatically an act of
the individual involved. "Yet," May writes:
as I will next show, this is not true of corporate
behavior. Some actions performed by individuals can
be better described (or re-described) as actions of
the corporation even though the actions take place
outside of the proper profit-making goals of those
organizations.75
It is impossible to give an adequate description of
such an event, claims May, without reference to the
"causal role of the corporation."76 Members of the
corporation are facilitated in their actions by the power
granted to them by the corporation. This is not to say
that every action of a member of a corporation is
automatically attributable to the corporation. Rather,
it is to point out that the boundary between individual
and corporate behavior is not so clearly drawn as Ladd
would claim. It is not the relation to corporate goals
that defines when an act of corporate members is to be
taken as an act of the corporation but rather the nature
of the relationship itself.
Taking his lead from Anthony Quinton, May describes
the relationship between a corporation and its members as





Wnen it is said that Gulf Oil Co. acts it is also
true that at least one of the members of that
corporate entity acts. But, more often than not, the
acts must be described with reference to the
corporation, since the acts here are different from
the acts of the individual members, just as a whole
is different from its parts.77
What makes possible such corporate action and what
distinguishes it from cooperative action is the vicarious
relationship set up between a corporation and its members
through the corporate structure.
The establishment or "incorporation" of the corpora-
tion is the process whereby persons (the incorporators)
delegate one entity, the corporation as their
representative.
May suggests that this is similar to the establish-
ment of the office of congressional representative
through whose agency the constituents can act. The
difference, says May, is that the stockholders can't
actually act through the corporation without the
corporation itself acting through others, namely, its
employees, managers, and other,.
In other words, in setting up the formal structure of
a corporation individuals establish a single entity to
act for them collectively. In this act of incorporation
the board of directors is delegated "as those individuals
whose collective decisions will be called the
77May, "Vicarious Agency," p. 79.
60
corporation's decis1ons."78 The corporation, in turn,
can only carry out the decisions of the board through its
appointed agents: managers, supervisors and employees.
"The corporation is thus a place-holder, standing in for
the stockholders who are the ones, collectively, who act
through the supervisors and employees."79
What distinguishes corporate actions from individual
ones is not whether the action in some sense coincides
with corporate goals, (as against Ladd and French) but
whether the individual who initiated the action had been
granted power from the corporation and had not in some
sense been prohibited by the corporation from using that
power in such a manner.
May has called this relationship a "causal nexus,"
meaning a constellation of relationships exists whereby
an employee has been empowered to act as the
corporation's (and ultimately the stockholders's) agent.
It is only when such a causal nexus exists, says May,
that an action can properly be called the action of a
corporation.
If the board members, for Instance, have collectively
decided to create a job with a certain description,
then anyone hired for that job who acts in conformity
with the job description, and whose actions are not
countermanded by a higher employee, acts for the
corporate board and hence, in some sense,for the
corporation. If the employee acts outside his or her
78Ibid.
79May, "Vicarious Agency," p. 75.
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job description or in a way opposed to specific
orders from higher employees, his or her actions are
not the actions of the corporation, since the causal
nexus has been broken. In this case, the employee is
solely responsible for the consequences of his or her
action.80
In this sense and this sense only can corporations be
sail to act.
But this is not the sort of action that is required
for moral agency. It is not intentional action even of
the simplest kind. The corporation acts vi3ariously, but
does not intend vicariously. The individuals acting as
agents for the corporation have intentions, but then
intentions, May implies, are irrelevant to whether or not
the action counts as that of the corporation.
Therefore, corporations do not qualify as moral
agents; and if they are not moral agents then we cannot
hold them morally responsible for their actions. But,
says May, there is another alternative. Recognizing the
unique way in which corporations act, we can grant them
an equally unique moral status.
I have already said I consider May's view one of the
most intriguing of the views we have discussed. This is
not to say, however, that his view lacks problems.
'Ake the moral person or structural restraint views,
the vicarious agency view 13 simply one model of




ort of empirical inquiry as the oth-rs. But, equally
Important is the question of in what thi: unique moral
status May proposes will consist. What rights and re-
sponsibilities does this unique sort of moral agency
entail? How would the criteria for corper-.-,te moral
agency differ from those for full-fledged agency?
Unfortunately, May does not give us many clues as to
what he has in mind. Whatever he has in mind, it is very
difficult to conceive of a notion of moral responsibility
that does not in some way involve Intentions. But May
has determined corporations are in no sense capable of
acting intentionally. Therefore if corporations are to
be granted a moral status, it must be a status that does
not require the capability of acting intentionally.
The extension of May's view is that we cannot
properly attribute moral status of any sort to corpora-
tions. Corporations cannot be said to think, consider
the effects of their actions on others or have empathy.
In Goodpaster's terms, they cannot be said to be capable
of taking the moral point of view. Under May's view, it
seems we could not even properly say a corporation has
decided.
Once qualified as a corporate action, it seems all we
are left to base our judgements concerning moral respon-
sibility on is the action itself. At most, it seems we
can say corporation A committed act B (say, donated a
large sum of money to the local United Way drive). We
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can say nothing of the reasons for its actions. So, if
according to our moral standards act B is a morally
responsible thing to do, corporation A is deserving of
our praise (even if the director of corporate giving
donated the money for an immoral reason), which seems to
go against the grain of most moral theory. In order to
receive moral praise, an action must have been taken for
the "right" reasons (or at least, not for the "wrong"
ones). Conversely, whatever the motivation of the
individuals involved, if a corporate act is found to be
morally irresponsible, then the corporation is deserving
of blame. But this sounds more like strict legal
liability than moral responsibility.
It is evident that whatever the look of this unique
moral status to be afforded corporations, it will be much
different from ordinary moral agency in some very crucial
ways. Perhaps so different that it makes little sense to
think of it in terms of the categories of agency
(responsibility, praise, blame, etc.) at all. According
to May's description, corporations are more properly
classified causes than agents.
If by setting aside a unique moral status for
corporations, May is trying to prevent a situation in
which corporations would escape moral judgement there are
other alternatives. Michael Keeley suggests one
provocative option, as we shall see when we look at his
critique of goal-oriented views in the next section.
A CRITIQUE OF GOAL-ORIENTED MODELS
(WITH NOTES FOR A NEW DIRECTION)
We have so far examined a range of positions on the
moral status of corporations. They have been classified
according to the model of organizational behavior on
which they were based. Now we will look at several of
the theories in a different light.
Organizational theorist Michael Keeley has pointed
out that a great deal of organizational theory is based
on what he calls an organismic or goal-oriented model.
The organismic model is, as the name implies, based on a
supposed analogy between living organisms (typically
human beings) and organizations. A central notion common
to organismic models is the claim that organizations have
aims and interests of their own. "Organismic views,"
writes Keeley:
suppose that social collectives, like biological
entities, have a welfare over and above the welfares
of participating individuals. Welfare, in this
context, implies a 'personal' preference for some
states of affairs over others. [Such properties
include) ...interests, needs, purposes, goals, and
the like...81
81
Michael Keeley, "Organizational Analogy: A
Comparison of Organismic and Socal Contract Models,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, XXV (June, 1980),342.
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This one common theme, claims Keeley, is also the one
fatal flaw of all organismic models.
It is my position that all of the views we have
examined (save the reductionist view, which has been
shown to fail on other grounds) fail as descriptive
models of corporate behavior and hence as theories of
moral status. And this is so if for no other reason than
because of one central and shared supposition, that
corporations have goals, intentions or purposes.
While I will probably receive little argument about
the appropriateness of placing the moral person theories
in the category of goal-directed models, it may not be so
obvious that the structural restraint or conditional
theories also belong in this category.
The structural restraint view probably seems the
least likely candidate for inclusion among organismic
views. After all, Ladd and Werhane refer to corporations
as analogous to machines.
But if we probe a little further, the centrality of
the notion of goal orientation in their views begins to
reveal itself. Formal organizations are defined by Ladd
as decision-making structures that are limited in the
factors that can be involved in their decisions by the
fact that they are structured solely for the achievement
of a set of predefined goals.
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It is hard to imagine a position more dependent on
the goal-orientation of organizations to its central
thesis. In this view, corporations are like single-
minded persons who are so focused on a particular goal
that they are extremely difficult to distract and often
are oblivious to outside interest.
As Michael Keeley has noted, it is just this kind of
goal-oriented behavior that provides the foundation upon
which to build a theory of corporations as moral
agents.
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There is a sense in which any intelligible use of the
words "goals", "purposes", and "intentions" draws its
meaning from the behavior of organisms. It is in the
context of organismic activity that we come to know what
these words mean. Any application of them to a
non-organismi(, subject seems to rely on an implicit
analogy with organismic behavior for its meaning. So,
even if Ladd and Werhane prefer to think of corporations
as decision-making, or goal-oriented machines, there 13 a
sense in which they appeal to an organismic analog.
Furthermore, Keeley points out that:
from a historical standpoint both 'mechanistic' and
'organic' models of organization...are organismic
variants. Mechanistic organizations are typically
portrayed as hierarchically controlled systems of
quite specific tasks, not unlike Plato's ideal state,
while organic organizations are seen to entail less
82
Keeley, "Organizations as Non-Persons," p. 149.
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precisely defined roles and more diffuse authority
relations. Still both models still share the same
essential organismic feature: as Burns and Stahler
observe, the aim of each type of organization is 'to
exploit the human resources of a concern in the most
efficient manner feasible in the circumstances.' In
slim it is a general focus on organizatioal goals and
well being that distinguishes the organismic
analogy .83
As for the conditional view, Donaldson suggests that
no one model of corporate behavior will cover all
corporations. Yet he goes on to propose a bureaucratic
model of corporate responsibility according to which
larger corporations qualify as special moral agents.
While it is a model that acknowledges the difference
between persons and larger organizations, it also relies
on an analogy between the two.
At any rate, Donaldson's criteria for corporate moral
agency entails the capability of some sort of purposeful
behavior. And since he claims that most, if not all
corporations could meet his criteria, he apparently also
believes corporations are capable of goal-oriented
behavior.
The challenge Keeley makes to organismic model
theorists is straightforward. Theorists who use
organismic models are making an empirical claim that
organizations have goals, intentions or purposes of their
own. Keeley suggests we try to find one.
83
Keeley, "Organizational Analogy," p. 343,344.
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As a framework for analysis, he proposes three
distinct concepts: goals for an organization, goals of an
organization, and consequences of an organization. In
these instances, "of" connotes ownership in the sense of
being a property of.
Goals for an organization are the results or outcomes
people want from organizational activity. Goals of an
organization are the outcomes the organization itself
wants. And consequences of an organization are the
actual results or outcomes of joint behavior.
If we want to identify goals for an organization we
can talk to those people involved with the organization.
Consequences of an organization are also fairly easily
identified by monitoring the actions of the
organization. "But," says Keeley, "it is not apparent
that the second, goals of an organization which are
supposed in the social person L and in all organismic
models] - can be identified by any means."
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However, moral person and structural restraint
theorists suggest that corporations reveal their goals in
many ways.
One of the most frequently cited examples of
,:orporate goals and purposes is an organization's
official documents and public statements by company
P4
Keeley, "Organizations as Non-Persons," p. 150.
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representatives: such things as charters, annual reports
3nd speeches by executive officers.
gowever, Keeley notes, actual examination of
corporate behavior has shown such official goals to be,
at best, misleading, and at worst deceptive. Generally,
they are put forth as public relations tools conceived to
get public approval. They often prove too broad to be a
guide to corporate behavior or function as decision
making premises and too vague to be helpful in the
understanding of a particular organization's behavior.
Organizational theorist Charles Perrow explains:
A business corporation, for example, may state that
its goal is to make a profit or adequate return on
Investment, or provide a customer service, or produce
goods.
This level of analysis is inadequate in itself for
full understanding of organizational behavior.
Official goals are purposely vague and general and do
not indicate two major factors which influence
organizational behavior: the host of decisions that
must be made among alternative ways of achieving
official goals and the priority of multiple goals,
and the many unofficial goals pursued by groups
within the organization.
It is these factors that influence the nature of the
organization, and distinguish it from another with an
identical goal.85
In addition, whatever their analytical value, Keeley
suggests that such official statements actually reflect
goals for a corporation. In the end, ft[m]ore evidence is
required that a stated goal is really a goal of the
85Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex
Organization," p. 55,56.
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organization than the fact that some participants say
BO
30.
Since most organizational theorists have rejected
official documents as the key to unlocking corporate
goals, they commonly appeal "to...actual organizational
activities and infer from these what 'real' or
'operative' goals they support."87
For example, Perrow writes, "Operative goals
designate the ends sought through the actual operating
policies of the organization; they tell us what the
organization actually is trying to do, regardless of what
the official goals say they are."
88
This is similar to Ladd, Werhane and French's appeal
to organizational procedures which are considered
analogous to rules of a game and from which
organizational intentions can be derived.
89
But, there are problems with operative goals as
well. They are difficult to discern and often
conflicting.
The sort of organizitional rules or procedures
identified by the theorists we have discussed may be of
86





Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex
Organization," p. 860.
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help in :dentifying wha* -ouflt3 as organizational vs.
non-organizatio,,a1 behavior. However even after we
Identify valid corporate behaviors, we are still left
with the problem of how to sort out conflicting goals for
the purpose of deriving organizational intentions.
For example, examination of a particular company may
show that the company (through the engineering
department) has a commitment to building high-quality
products using only the finest material available for
their construction. At the same time, we may also find
that the company (through the purchasing department) has
a policy of cutting corners and settling for second best
in order to save money. How are we to decide which
operational goal truly reflects the desire of the
company?
Furthermore it is not at all clear that even if we
Identify organizational behavior that it is possible to
"establish the organizational intent of that behavior, or
that [the organization] has any real organizational
Intent at all."90
Additionally, French makes the wildly optimistic
claim (as is common with organismic theories) that in
corporations, individual wills and purposes are melded
into a single and unified corporate will and purpose. As
proof for this claim, French r—lies heavily on the dictum
that the whole 13 more than the sum nf' parts, or in this
----94r6rJ., 151.
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case, that organizations are more than the aggregate of
the people who make them up. According to French, this
"more" entails an overriding corporate will or intent.
So we find ourselves back to the question of whether
organizational behavior entails organizational intent.
Even if we grant that corporations can "act," this
doesn't seem obvious.
As Keeley writes, "It seems fairly clear that
organizations have some collective properties of their
own. It is not clear, however, that intentionality is
among them."
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As he points out, organizations produce many
consequences that can be properly labeled properties of
the organization in the sense that they are "more than
the aggregate effects of individual behavior,"
92 and
these in turn might be called "acts" of the organization.
From the fact that an organization so acts, in the
sense of producing an effect, it is a large leap to
the claim that it can act, in the sense of intending
an effect. To establish th latter, one must be able
to distinguish consequences intended by an organiza-
tion - goals of the organization - from other
consequences.93
Such consequences of corporate behavior or corporate
acts might include profits, deficits, service, salaries,
growth, pollutants, job-induced injuries, racial
discrimination, etc.
91
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Organismic theorists want to call only some of these
organizational goals, but on what grounds?
Both formal and operational goals ultimately are
reducible to some individual's goals for the
corporation. As Keeley demonstrates, organizational
theorists only count those consequences which are goals
for some individuals involved in the organization as
operational goals such as profit or growth, but not
pollutants. "So," writes Keeley:
neither French nor Ladd nor any organizational
theorist, to my knowledge, has offered a criterion
for distinguishing organizational goals from a larger
set of organizational consequences that is
independent of participant satisfaction. In short
consequences of and goals for an organization are
generally identifiable, whTle independent goals of an
organization are not.94
What does this mean for corporate moral status? If
corporations are not eapable of acting intentionally,
then they do not qualify as moral agents and have none of
the attendant responsibilities or rights.
As we have already seen, rather than grant that
corporations are not moral agents some philosophers have
proposed that we not disqualify corporations from moral
agency altogether, but rather establish a new moral
status, one not involving intentionality.
94Ibid., 154.
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But, for reasons we have already discussed, this
seems a misguided reaction. Because of their size and
the amount of financial resources they control,
corporations have a tremendous impact on our lives. They
affect the economy, our environment, legislation,
literally every aspect of our lives. It is in our
Interest to monitor and to try to affect their actions.
Nonetheless, we may actually cause more harm than good by
holding on to a conceptual model that has been shown to
have a very serious disanalogy.
There are other alternatives. Simply because
corporations do not qualify as moral agents does not mean
we cannot make moral judgments about them.
Along this line, Patricia Werhane makes a useful
distinction between moral accountability and social
responsibility. We may not be justified in holding
corporations morally .ccountable for their outcomes. But
we can apply pressures on them to get them to act in ways
we find morally preferable to others. Corporations that
respond in the ways we want are, in Werhane's terms,
socially responsible.
Of course this approach has its own problems.
Prominent among them is how corporations are to sort to
out to which of the many and potentially conflicting
demands to respond. There is also the matter of how to
reconcile regulation of corporations with a so-called
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free market economy. But these are certainly not
unsolvable problems.
There is no arguing that the activities of large,
complex organizations like corporations and their
relation to the rest of human society are suitable
objects of philosophical inquiry. What I am suggesting
is that we put the issue of corporate moral status to
rest and turn our energies to more fruitful models of
corporate behavior as tools of inquiry.
Keeley has suggested that perhaps the organismic
model's chief historical competitor, the social-contract
model, would be a more flexible tool that would yield a
greater understanding of organizational structure and
behavior, as well as the relation of corporations to
morality, individuals and the societies in which they
exist.95 Having concluded that corporations do not
qualify as moral agents, Keeley writes:
It is still logical, for instance, to argue that, as
social systems if not persons, organization X is
preferable to organization Y on moral grounds.
Reconsider the game analogy. While it is odd to ask
whether a game itself is behaving responsibly, it is
reasonable to ask whether it is fair, right, or the
like. Possibly one could say that a potentially
violent game such as hockey, to the extent that it
entails penalties for such acts as tripping, slashing
and fighting, is morally preferable to a similar game
which entails no penalties, but allows participants
955ee Keeley, "A Social Justice Approach to
Organizational Evaluation" Administrative Science 
Quarterly, XXII (June, 1973), 272-292; and Keeley,
"Organizations As Non-Persons" p. 149-155.
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to inflict unlimited injury on one another to further
their own cause. So again in the case of organi-
zations, those which minimize injurious consequences
to participants might be preferable on moral
grounds. And various sorts of, say governmental,
policies may be morally justified in promoting the
minimization of aversive organizational consequences.
The image of organization implied here is along lines
of a Lockean itrust'...96
The image of corporations according to this
social-contract model would be very different than that
portrayed by the organismic model. Just what its
Implications for the relation of morality to corporations
has yet to be fully explored.97
96
Keeley, "Organizations as Non-Persons," p. 155.
97Keeley has begun this task in his articles
"Organizational Analogy: A Comparison of Organismic and
Social Contract Models" and "A Social Justice Approach to
Organizational Evaluation."
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